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Abstract. Policy-based access control is a technology that achieves sep-
aration of concerns through evaluating an externalized policy at each ac-
cess attempt. While this approach has been well-established for request-
response applications, it is not supported for database queries of data-
driven applications, especially for attribute-based policies. In particu-
lar, search operations for such applications involve poor scalability with
regard to the data set size for this approach, because they are influ-
enced by dynamic runtime conditions. This paper proposes a scalable
application-level middleware solution that performs runtime injection of
the appropriate rules into the original search query, so that the result set
of the search includes only items to which the subject is entitled. Our
evaluation shows that our method scales far better than current state of
practice approach that supports policy-based access control.
1 Introduction
Access control is a crucial security measure constraining actions that subjects (e.g.,
users) can perform on resources. To manage this, several requirements must be
taken into account. These include the ability to specify fine-grained rules and
support for separation of concerns [6], which enables application developers to
delegate security management responsibilities.
A combination of policy-based and attribute-based access control satisfies
these requirements. Policy-based access control externalizes access control from
the application code and has a policy engine evaluation at each access at-
tempt [21]. This technology provides separation of concerns and increases ap-
plication modularity. Attribute-based access control supports attributes to be
assigned to subjects, actions, resources and the environment. These attributes
are compared to each other and to concrete values to determine if access is per-
mitted [11]. This supports specification of fine-grained rules such as “a document
can be read by its creator at any time, and by members of the IT department
during working hours”. XACML [14] is considered the de-facto standard policy
language for policy-based, attribute-based access control, with characteristics
such as policy trees and multi-valued logic.
Because databases hold a crucial position within IT infrastructures, support
for properties such as the ability to enforce fine-grained rules and separation
Fig. 1: The a posteriori filter approach eval-
uates an externalized policy for each item
of the result set.
Fig. 2: The rewriting approach takes
into the access control policy as part
of the query.
of concerns is essential for database operations performed by data-driven appli-
cations as well. However, existing approaches generally scale insufficiently with
regard to the database size.
Access control techniques integrated in database systems fall short for
three reasons. First, they require database administrators to be involved in the
specification of the policies, thereby violating the separation of concerns. Second,
contemporary applications are designed according to a multi-tier architecture.
This results in applications that perform queries on behalf of the subject without
the latter being identified to the database, which only supports access to be
constrained for individual applications instead of for subjects [20]. Third, in
large scale deployments such as cloud applications, subjects are managed at the
application level and not by the identity management system of the database.
In contrast, access control techniques in the application, such as an a poste-
riori filter approach can support externalized policies, but evaluate them for each
item that is part of the search result (i.e., the resources). This approach filters
out any item to which the subject is not entitled based on a policy evaluation, as
illustrated in Figure 1. While this approach supports separation of concerns, as
security administrators can manage policies independently from the application,
it does not scale with an increasing result set. This is true especially for large
attribute-based policies [22].
This paper takes an alternative approach that performs runtime injection of
the appropriate access rules into the search query based on the context in which
subjects perform the search operation. It is illustrated in Figure 2. The approach
leverages the filtering system of the underlying database to select only items
to which the subject is entitled. Using this approach, we support separation
of concerns, the ability to specify attribute-based policies, and can scale with
regard to the database size. This paper presents the following contributions:
– A set of well-defined transformation rules that rewrites STAPL policies [2],
which are similar to XACML [14], into search queries for RDBMSes.
– An architecture and evaluation of Sequoia, an application-level middleware
that transforms and executes search queries for data-driven applications.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes supporting technologies
and discusses the state of the art. Section 3 elaborates on the architecture of
Sequoia that enables query rewriting. Section 4 discusses how STAPL policies
can be transformed to a query expression. Section 5 provides an evaluation of a
prototype of Sequoia. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background and related work
This section discusses the background that serves as a basis for the remainder
of the paper. First, it discusses the supporting technologies, such as XACML
and STAPL, and provides further analysis of the problem. Next, it elaborates
on related database access control technologies.
Supporting technologies. Access control policies can be externalized from
the application into a separate artifact that is evaluated by a specialized engine
at each access attempt [21]. As opposed to in-code access control, this approach,
called policy-based access control, increases modularity, avoids application rede-
ployment when a policy is modified, and provides separation of concerns.
XACML [14] is a framework and policy language that supports policy-based
access control. It also supports the specification of attribute-based policies, which
enables fine-grained rule specification. Attribute-based policies support attributes
assigned to subjects, resources, actions and the environment that are compared
to each other and to concrete values in expressions. Attributes are substituted
by concrete values at each access attempt to determine if access is permitted.
The basic elements of a XACML policy are policy components and rules1.
Rules have a condition expression, and policy components have a target expres-
sion2. An expression evaluates to true, false, or leads to an error (e.g., when
an attribute could not be retrieved). Expressions compare attributes or combine
other expressions with logical operators (i.e., and, or, not). Whenever an ex-
pression evaluates to false for a rule or policy component, that element is
not applicable. Elements that are not applicable are not taken into account
in the evaluation decision. For example, rule r1 of Figure 3 is not applicable
for a subject with org=bankA that performs a view action on a resource with
is private=true and destination org=bankB. However, the targets of p1 and
p2 are applicable for this access attempt.
Besides a condition, rules also specify an effect (i.e., permit or deny) that
is taken into account when the condition of the rule is applicable. As a result,
policy elements evaluate to permit, deny, not applicable or an error (called in-
determinate in XACML).
A policy component evaluation can yield multiple, possibly conflicting deci-
sions (e.g., when multiple rules are applicable). This is resolved by using com-
bining algorithms. This paper focuses on permit overrides (in which a permit
1 XACML differentiates between policy sets and policies, but for brevity we make no
distinction in this paper.
2 Rules can also have targets, but a conjunction with their condition is semantically
equivalent, so we disregard this.
Fig. 3: Example of a XACML-like policy. Policy component p1 has a deny overrides
combining algorithm and a target expression that specifies its children are only relevant
for view actions. Components p2 and p3 have a permit overrides and first applicable
combining algorithm, respectively, and child rules. Dashes indicate empty expressions.
decision overrides other decisions of direct children in the component), deny
overrides and first applicable (in which the first applicable rule determines the
final decision). For example, p1 in Figure 3 has a deny overrides algorithm,
meaning that if p3 evaluates to deny, then p1 evaluates to deny regardless of the
decision of p2 or p4. Policy components have either rules or other policy compo-
nents as children, thus forming policy trees. When their target expressions are
applicable, their child elements are also evaluated to come to a policy decision.
This paper uses STAPL [2] policies as a basis for transformation. STAPL is a
framework and policy language that closely resembles XACML, but which offers
more ease of use and a slightly better evaluation performance. Any XACML
policy can generally be converted to a STAPL policy, and STAPL policies can
similarly be expressed in XACML. Hence, the transformation process applied in
this paper is also applicable for XACML policies.
Figure 3 illustrates a small example policy of an industry case study that
motivated this work [7]. Here, if the action that is performed is “view” (e.g., as
is the case in a search operation), subjects can access documents depending on
their department, whether they have created it or were addressed, and so on. For
example, a subject of the sales department can view invoices if the organization
to which he/she belongs was addressed (rules 1, 5 and 7), unless it involves a
confidential invoice (rule 6).
While both XACML and STAPL support fine-grained specification of access
rules, their policy evaluation process also involves a considerable overhead [22].
For traditional request-response applications, this overhead is in many cases
acceptable. When the policy is evaluated for a large set of resources such as for
search operations on a database, however, this can become an impeding factor.
Related work. Because of its importance, a lot of prior research has fo-
cused on database security [3]. This paper focuses on row-level access control [3]
that follows the Truman model3 [19]. In this regard, there generally exist three
approaches to provide scalable search queries on databases.
The first approach involves techniques generally classified under the term
“Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC)” [19]. FGAC uses query rewriting tech-
3 In a Truman model, queries are transparently modified to restrict access of a subject
to database items.
niques [1, 5, 8, 10, 15, 19] to provide database security. This is typically performed
using rules that are specified in the native query language of the target database
and may be realized through the creation of views. While this approach scales
with regard to the size of the result set, it also has some issues. In particular,
since rules are specified in the native query language, they at least partly violate
the principle of separation of concerns [6], because the database administrator
must help specify the policies. Worse, this approach generally assumes a two-tier
architecture in which subjects directly query the database and can be identified
accordingly. Contemporary applications are typically designed according to a
multi-tier architecture, and generally perform queries on behalf of the subject
without identifying them to the database [20]. This only supports access control
to filter based on accessing applications. Moreover, in large-scale deployments
such as cloud applications, subjects are typically managed at the application
level, and not by the identity management system of the database. Our ap-
proach does not suffer these issues due to substitution of subject properties in
the query and the support for externalized policies that are rewritten.
A second approach involves configuring the access control component that
is used by the database based on an external policy. Compared to the previous
approach, this does support separation of concerns. Notable examples for this
approach are MyABDAC [12] and a recent system proposed by Mutti et al [13].
MyABDAC uses XACML policies to generate access control lists for the under-
lying database system. These can then be employed to constrain access. While
this approach maintains separation of concerns, it also assumes a two-tier archi-
tecture and hence suffers the same issues as the first approach. Moreover, it does
not scale well with regard to the size of the database. Mutti et al. introduce a
system that extends SQLite for SELinux support. While this system scales, it
requires specification of database hooks and supports only lattice-based policies,
which are not as fine-grained as XACML policies supported by our approach.
A third approach involves evaluating the access control policy for each of the
items in the result set of a search query. Bouncer [16] takes this approach for
the CPOL trust management system. While this approach supports separation
of concerns and the specification of fine-grained policies, it can also introduce
a considerable overhead when the size of the search result set increases. This is
especially true for fine-grained rules, typically included in attribute-based poli-
cies [22]. Our approach does not suffer from this problem.
This paper pursues an approach that uses query rewriting by using an ex-
ternalized policy that is injected at runtime as part of the search query. This
approach scales with regard of the result set and regards the separation of con-
cerns principle. Also, it does not require DBMS modification. This approach has
also been explored by Axiomatics Data Access Filter [18]. Compared to them,
this work focuses on the transformation process, including conversion of XACML
concepts such as policy trees, combining algorithms and multi-valued logic to a
database query. Moreover, we present a thorough evaluation of the approach.
Besides access control techniques, several other security measures can secure
search queries on database systems. In particular, secure query processing [24]
and homomorphic encryption [9] aim at supporting queries on an encrypted
data set. While these measures have several issues such as performance and fine-
grainedness of the data set, they can be used complementary to our approach.
Lastly, this research was also influenced by related work done in the enforce-
ment of usage control. In particular, Pretschner et al. [17] have presented an
architecture that enforces usage control policies in a distributed system, with
an emphasis of reducing policy enforcement overhead. In contrast, our approach
does not focus on distributed evaluation for enforcing policies.
3 Sequoia architecture
This section describes an application-level solution that supports access control
on database search operations in data-driven applications. The solution provides
scalability, expressiveness and separation of concerns. In order to comply with
these requirements, we employ a policy-based, attribute-based access control sys-
tem as a basis for the access control rules that must be supported. Since XACML
is considered the de-facto standard for such access control systems, we use its
language model as a basis for the transformation. We use a rewriting approach
that involves transforming the policy to a query. The transformation process
must cope with fundamental issues to support STAPL policy conversion. In par-
ticular, characteristics such as policy trees, multi-valued logic and combining
algorithms must be translated to a semantically equivalent query expression.
Scope. This paper analyzes the query rewriting approach for relational
databases. We expect resources to be represented as the rows of (one or more)
tables and their corresponding attributes as the columns of these tables. These
resources are referred to as items. We assume that all attributes of the resources
referred to in the policy are stored in the database. In addition, the database
schema is expected to provide proper mapping of the attributes onto columns.
Fig. 4: The rewriting approach reduces, transforms and translates the policy and com-
bines it with the original search parameters into a query.
Overview. Figure 4 provides an overview of the architecture. The Sequoia
middleware operates between the application layer and the database. Whenever
the application queries the database, the middleware intercepts the query and
Fig. 5: Reduction of Figure 3 for a subject with id=51, dptmt=sales and org=bankA.
performs run-time injection of the appropriate access rules that are combined
with the original search parameters in a query. The composed query reflects
only relevant rules for the subject and ensures that only the items to which the
subject is entitled (i.e., those permitted if the policy is evaluated for each item
of the original search result) are returned.
The policy semantics are preserved throughout the transformation process.
The result set for executing the transformed query is equivalent to the set of
items permitted when performing a policy evaluation on each item resulting
from the original query. To support this, the middleware uses four components:
the reducer, transformer, translator and composer.
Reducer. This component obtains the relevant attribute values associated
with the acting subject, action and environment. Next, similar to [18], it performs
a partial substitution and evaluation of all expressions in the policy that do
not refer to any resource attributes (which will be queried in the database).
This enables pruning of the policy for rules and policy components that always
evaluate to true or false. The reduction minimizes the query that is generated and
eliminates the need for subject attributes to be stored in the same database as the
resources that are searched. For example, consider the policy in Figure 3 reduced
for the view action and a subject with id=51, dptmt=sales and org=bankA. This
is shown in Figure 5. The policy is significantly smaller, which avoids redundant
checks and simplifies the final query.
Transformer. This component transforms the policy to a boolean expres-
sion that can be translated to the query language and combined with search
parameters at a later stage. Due to policy reduction, no attributes associated
with the subject, action or environment should be left in the policy as they were
substituted with the relevant values.
The transformation must be equivalent for permit decisions. This means
that whenever a policy evaluation leads to a permit decision for a certain item,
the corresponding boolean expression evaluation must also be true. In contrast,
if the evaluation of a policy leads to a not applicable or deny decision, its
corresponding expression must evaluate to false. This also filters out any items
for which the evaluation is indecisive. If an error occurs during the evaluation of
the boolean expression, the search query must be aborted altogether4.
4 In this transformation, we do not consider extended indeterminate decisions that
are defined in XACML 3.0. Contrary to request-response applications, errors can
not always be gracefully handled for individual data rows.
For example, consider again Figure 5 the reduced policy. The transformation
of this policy for the acting subject results in boolean expression [resource.is pri-
vate∧ (resource.destination org == ‘bankA′ ∨ resource.creator id == ‘51′)]∧
[resource.type == ‘invoice′ ∧ ¬resource.confidential]. This expression is only
satisfied for items to which the subject is entitled.
Transformation of STAPL policies is not trivial. In particular, we need to take
into account policy trees, multi-valued logic and combining algorithms when a
policy is transformed to a single expression. For this reason, we elaborate on this
in more detail in Section 4.
Translator. This component translates the expression that resulted from the
transformation to the query language of the database to which it is submitted.
This involves two tasks. First, the syntax of the expression is translated to the
syntax of the query language for the target database. Second, all attributes
referenced in the expression are translated to column references in the database.
While the first task is generally straightforward because SQL supports boolean
expressions equivalent to the ones to which we transformed, an attribute-to-
schema mapping is required for the second task. This mapping describes how
attributes are mapped onto the columns corresponding to tables in the database.
In some cases, some of the attributes associated with the resource could be stored
in a different table than the one that is queried. As a consequence, the mapping
enables the translator to cope with the complexity of the database schema and
can indicate which joins are required in the search query. The table that is being
queried is the base table from which joins to auxiliary tables are accommodated.
Composer. This component combines search parameters of the original
query with the translated access rules. For example, the transformation of the
policy of Figure 5 was previously translated to database-specific syntax. This
is now combined with the query using an and -operator. Also, any required join
operations are injected in the search query.
4 Transformation
This section addresses the second step in the approach outlined in the previous
section. It performs the transformation of characteristics such as policy trees,
multi-valued logic and combining algorithms to a boolean expression. To achieve
a boolean expression, we iterate over two steps until the policy consists of a single
policy component with a permit overrides algorithm, no target and only rules
as children. We call this a flat component. Figure 6 shows an overview of the
process. Figure 7 illustrates an example.
As a first step, we transform every component in the policy tree that has
only rules as children (i.e., a leaf component) to an equivalent flat component.
Also, we conjunct the target expression of each transformed policy component
with the condition expressions of all of its child rules. For this, the original
combining algorithm determines how the transformation is performed to retain
semantic equivalence. As a second step, we regard every node component, i.e.
components with only flat components as children. We pull up all rules of the
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Fig. 6: Transformation process overview Fig. 7: Policy transformation example
children of these node components and transform them to a policy component
with a permit overrides algorithm. Similar to the first step, semantic equivalence
is retained through transformation methods that differ for each combining al-
gorithm. By iterating over these steps, the policy tree is gradually flattened to
result in a single, flat component containing only rules. A boolean expression is
then created as disjunction of the conditions of all permit rule children. Figure 7
illustrates the transformation process applied on a policy. As the figure shows,
the policy is gradually transformed to a single component in bottom-up fashion.
The boolean expression is semantically equivalent to the original with regard
to the permit decision. In other words, if the policy evaluates to permit, the
boolean expression evaluates to true. For not applicable and deny decisions in
the policy, the boolean expression evaluates to false. If an error occurs (e.g., an
attribute value could not be retrieved), the search query will be aborted. We
have developed a formal proof that the transformation process maintains the
semantics of the policy when these equivalence rules are taken into account [4].
Note that Turkmen et al. [23] also developed a flattening process for policies, but
focus on policy analysis, while our approach is optimized for database queries.
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on the two steps that are
iterated over during the transformation process. Section 5 evaluates a Sequoia
prototype that employs this process for generating queries from STAPL policies.
Step 1: Transforming leaf components
This step transforms all leaf components (i.e., policy components with only rules
as children) into flat components. In order to retain semantic equivalence, this
requires a different transformation approach depending on the combining algo-
rithm of the component. For example, consider component p3 from Figure 5.
When this component is transformed to a flat component, the condition of rule
r7 is transformed so that it evaluates to false if either r5 or r6 is applicable.
As a first part of this step, for each rule, the target expression is included
in conjunction with the condition of that rule. This is done regardless of the
combining algorithm. Next, we perform a transformation that depends on the
combining algorithm of the component5.
For first applicable components, a permit rule is applicable only if none
of the deny rules that precede it are applicable. Consequently, we can transform
a permit rule by conjunction of its original condition with the negation of con-
ditions of its preceding deny rules. The deny rules of the original component
can then be included without modification. More formally, the condition of each
permit rule ri of the original leaf component P is transformed as follows:
cond(ri) ∧
∧
rj∈pre(ri,P )
¬cond(rj)
In which cond indicates the condition of a rule, and pre the set of all preceding
deny rules in the same component P .
For deny overrides components any applicable deny rule overrides other
decisions. Consequently, the transformation of a permit rule conjuncts the orig-
inal condition with the negation of all of the deny rule conditions of the original
component. Similar to the first applicable transformation approach, deny rules
are included without modification. More formally, the condition of each permit
rule ri of the original leaf component P is transformed as follows:
cond(ri) ∧
∧
rj∈deny(P )
¬cond(rj)
With deny the set of all deny rules in the same component P as the given rule.
For permit overrides components, no further transformation is required as
it already is a flat component after conjunction of conditions with the target.
Consider components p2 and p3 from Figure 5 as an example of the ap-
proach. In this example, rules r1, r2 and r4 are rewritten to conjunct target
“resource.is private” as an additional constraint for their conditions. For p3, on
the other hand, r7 is transformed to contain a negation of conditions of r5 and
r6. Also, r5 and r6 are included in the result without modification. This results
in a permit overrides component with permit rule “resource.type == ‘invoice’ ∧
¬ resource.confidential” and original deny rules r5 and r6.
Step 2: Pulling up flat components rules
This step involves all policy components that only have flat components as chil-
dren. The policy components for which all child components satisfy these re-
quirements are called node components. In this step, we transform the rules of
all child components, and include them as direct children of the node component.
We also change the node component combining algorithm to permit overrides.
The transformation approach for pulling up flat component rules to be com-
bined at a higher level in the policy tree differs from the one introduced in step 1.
In particular, it takes into account how rules of one child component affect the
5 For brevity, we do not elaborate on approaches for minimizing the generated expres-
sion in this paper.
decision process at the level of the node component. For example, consider p1
in Figure 5. A deny rule such as r5 can affect the decision process even if r1
is applicable, because the deny decision that may stem from r5 overrides any
permit decision due to the deny overrides of p1.
In order to pull up the rules associated with flat components, the transfor-
mation method needs to ensure that the result has the same semantics as the
original policy component. Hence, the transformed rules must take into account
their original condition, but may also include conditions of rules from other child
components of the node component.
If the node component has a first applicable algorithm, all of the deny rules
of preceding child components are taken into account when a permit rule of a
certain child component is transformed. Consequently, the generated rule cannot
be applicable if a deny rule of a preceding child component was applicable. This
is done by generating a permit rule that has the condition of the original permit
rule in conjunction with the negation for each deny rule of preceding components.
Similar to the previous step, the deny rules are included without modification.
More formally, the condition of each permit rule ri of a child component is
transformed as follows:
cond(ri) ∧
∧
rj∈preco(ri)
¬cond(rj)
In which preco reflects all deny rules from policy components of the given rule’s
ancestor that precede its parent. Deny rules are included in the result without
modification. Note that if a deny rule of preco is applicable, it can still be
overridden by a permit rule condition of its own component.
If the node component has a deny overrides algorithm, the permit rules
of all child components are combined in a single, unified permit rule. All deny
rules are again included without modification. The unified rule must ensure
two properties. First, at least one permit rule of the child components must
be applicable in order for the unified rule to be applicable. Second, for each
child component, if no permit rule is applicable in that child, then its deny
rules must not be applicable. Otherwise, the unified rule is also not applicable.
The first property ensures that the not applicable decision is propagated during
the flattening of the policy tree. The second property ensures that if a child
component leads to a deny decision, then the evaluation of its parent component
will also lead to a deny decision because of the deny overrides algorithm of the
node component. In this case, the unified rule can not be applicable, while a
deny rule is. The unified permit rule has a condition that is a conjunction of a
clause of all permit rule conditions appl, and all component clauses comp. Here,
appl ensures the first property and the component clauses ensure the second
property of the unified rule. More formally, we describe this as
appl(P ) :=
ri∈permits(P )∨
cond(ri)
In which permits retrieves all permit rules of the given policy component and all
its children. Similarly, denies fetches deny rules of a component and its children.
For each child component PC , component clause comp is constructed as
comp(PC) := (
ri∈permits(PC)∨
cond(ri)) ∨
∧
ri∈denies(PC)
¬cond(ri)
If a node component has a permit overrides algorithm, all rules of its
children are included without modification.
For example, consider again component p1 from Figure 5. In order to be
permitted, the following expression must be satisfied for a evaluation request:
“[resource.is private∧ (resource.destination org == ‘bankA′ ∨ resource.crea-
tor id == ‘51′)] ∧ [resource.type == invoice ∧ ¬resource.confidential]”. Here,
the unified rule was simplified by applying common logical reduction techniques.
Flat component to boolean expression
The transformation steps are repeated until a single, flat component is resulted.
Finally, the flat policy component is converted to a boolean expression by con-
structing a disjunction of all permit rule conditions of the flat policy component.
If none of the permit rule conditions are applicable, the boolean expression will
evaluate to false, and the database item for which the expression was evalu-
ated will not be included in the result set. This maintains the original policy
semantics because each transformation step ensures that a permit rule of the
transformation is only applicable if it was not overridden by a deny decision. A
formal equivalence proof is given in [4].
5 Performance evaluation
As discussed earlier in this paper, the a posteriori filter approach for support-
ing policy-based access control for search operations on databases becomes pro-
hibitive with regard to performance when the size of the search result set is
large. To resolve this, we have presented an alternative approach that uses query
rewriting to reduce the overhead of access control. This section evaluates an im-
plementation of the rewriting approach discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 for
transformations from STAPL [2] policies to relational databases, and compares
it to the a posteriori filter approach that was illustrated in Figure 1.
We evaluate five aspects. First, we discuss scalability of the rewriting ap-
proach compared to the a posteriori filter. Second, we evaluate the overhead
introduced by the rewriting approach. Third, we discuss the impact of policy
size for different combining algorithms. Fourth, we inspect the performance im-
pact of the amount of evaluated attributes. Fifth, we also determine the impact
of the proportion of permitted items on performance.
Setup. The evaluation was performed on a Dell OptiPlex 755 computer with
Intel Core 2 Duo 3GHz processor and 4GB internal memory using Ubuntu 15.10
as an operating system and performing all database requests using JDBC to a
MariaDB 6 database with caching disabled as much as possible. All queries were
performed locally (i.e., no network traffic was involved). We repeated all tests
10000 times after 100 warmups and took the mean values for processing times.
6 https://mariadb.org/
Scalability. As a first part of the evaluation, we have assessed the scalability
of the rewriting approach with regard to the size of the search result set. To do
this, we have compared how the approach performs with regard to a posteriori
filter, which was illustrated in Figure 1. The test evaluated the total processing
time required to perform the search query together with determining what items
must be part of the result set. We did this based on an extensive policy that
was inspired by an industry case study [7] that motivated this work and that
contains 32 policy components and 63 rules that regard 33 attributes7.
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Fig. 8: Comparison of processing times for an increasing data set size. Lower is better.
The results are shown in Figure 8. They demonstrate the processing times
involved with both approaches for a subject that is entitled to about 40% of the
items. As the figure shows, the rewriting approach performs far better than the
a posteriori filter. We only performed evaluation for the latter for up to 25000
items, because measuring it involved too much processing time for repeated
tests. In contrast, the rewriting approach requires considerably less processing
time with regard to the database size. For example, the same test for a data set of
a million items had a processing time of 4037ms. This included the serialization
of the items in the result set in Java data structures, which amounted to 67% of
the query processing time on average. Consequently, we can conclude that the
rewriting approach scales well with an increasing data set.
Overhead. As a second part of the evaluation, we inspected the overhead
involved with the different steps of the rewriting process. We have done this for
an increasing search result size in a same test setup as the scalability test.
Figure 9 shows the overhead of different transformation steps in the rewriting
approach. The figure shows that the policy reduction and transformation steps
7 This policy can be found at https://github.com/stapl-dsl/stapl-examples/
blob/master/src/main/scala/stapl/examples/policies/EdocsPolicy.scala.
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tion of the policy depth for first appli-
cable (FA), deny overrides (DO), per-
mit overrides (PO) policies and the a
posteriori filter. Lower is better.
remain constant and are dominated by the query processing for larger result
sets. The overhead for the policy reduction and transformation steps depends on
the subject. For some subjects, for example, the transformation step amounts to
less than 1ms.
Because overhead of the transformation steps remain constant, the query
processing time becomes the dominant factor in the total processing time as
the size of the database increases. In the a posteriori filter approach, the time
required for policy evaluation on each element is the dominating factor for the
processing time. Also, note that the result of the transformation can be cached for
each subject, which reduces the overall processing time for subsequent searches.
Policy size impact. As a third part of the evaluation, we have assessed
the impact of the size of the policy on the processing time of the rewriting
approach. We evaluate this for the deny overrides, permit overrides and first
applicable combining algorithms.
The test generated policies for varying policy depths, i.e., numbers of nodes on
the path from the root policy component to the leaf-level components. For each
depth, the policy contains 2d+1 − 1 policy elements, 2d of which are rules. Each
component has two children and the same combining algorithm. Leaf components
all have one permit and one deny rule. The test was performed on 1000 elements.
Figure 10 shows the processing time for the rewriting approach for different
combining algorithms and the a posteriori filter when the depth of the policy tree
increases. For the a posteriori filter, we have plotted the mean evaluation time
for the three policy types, as they had similar processing times. As expected,
total processing times increase due to an increasing number of policy elements.
The deny overrides algorithm performs worst for the rewriting approach. This
is because the transformation introduces inevitable redundancy in the query to
maintain original semantics. This test, however, involves the worst-case scenario
for a large policy. Moreover, a posteriori filtering still exceeds the query rewriting
approach for an extensive policy. The largest proportion of the overhead is due
15
30
45
60
75
90
10 20 30 40 50
Number of attributes involved
To
ta
l p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
tim
e 
(m
s)
Approach A posteriori filter Rewriting
Fig. 11: Processing time in function
of the number of involved attributes.
Lower is better.
20
40
60
80
0 25 50 75 100
Proportion of permitted items (%)
To
ta
l p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
tim
e 
(m
s)
Approach A posteriori filter Rewriting
Fig. 12: Impact of the proportion of
permitted items on processing times.
Lower is better.
to policy transformation, which amounts to about 85% of the total time for deny
overrides components in the rewriting approach.
The permit overrides transformations, on the other hand, perform best be-
cause the transformation does not need to take into account the conditions of
any deny rules.
Attribute impact. As a fourth part of the evaluation, we investigated the
impact that the amount of attributes involved in the evaluation had on the pro-
cessing time of the secured search query. To determine this, we generated several
policies that require n resource attributes to be evaluated prior to resorting to
a decision, with n ranging from 5 up to 50 attributes. The test was performed
on a data set of 1000 items, from which 50% are part of the final result.
Figure 11 shows that the rewriting approach performs better than the a
posteriori filter, while difference in processing times is fairly constant. The a
posteriori filter has higher overhead because all items are fetched and evaluated.
For the rewriting approach, the curve is explained due to the time required to
perform the transformation (up to 78% of the total time) and the overall impact
of the amount of attributes seems limited for the amount of attributes involved.
Result size impact. As the last part of the evaluation, we measured the
impact on the processing time of the proportion of items that are part of the
permitted result set. This test considers the processing time for an increasing
percentage of items of the data set to which the subject is entitled. For this test,
we used the same setup as for the attribute impact evaluation.
Figure 12 demonstrates that the processing time for the a posteriori filter
approach remains fairly constant, because it needs to evaluate all items regardless
of the proportion of permitted items. In contrast, the rewriting approach has a
processing time that is directly proportional to the amount of items that are
permitted. In other words, if a subject is entitled to a smaller proportion of the
data set, the rewriting approach will perform better than if he/she is entitled to
a large proportion. For example, if a subject is entitled to 25% of the items, the
processing time will be smaller than if he/she is entitled to 75% of the items. In
all cases however, the rewriting approach performs significantly better than the
a posteriori filter.
Summary. The evaluation indicates that the rewriting approach performs
far better than the a posteriori filter, because it scales well with regard to the
result set size and the number of attributes evaluated. Moreover, the approach
performs even better when a subject is entitled to a smaller proportion of the
data set, which is common in contemporary applications.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented an application-level middleware that supports scalable
policy-based access control for search queries on relational databases. It does
this in a manner that also supports expressive policies and separation of con-
cerns. Because the de-facto standard for policy-based, attribute-based languages
is XACML, this paper also elaborated on a method that transforms policies with
a similar model to a boolean query expression that can be translated and com-
bined with the search parameters. The evaluation shows that our approach per-
forms far better than the current state of practice. As a result, we can conclude
that this work constitutes an important step for maturation of both policy-based
access control and database access control using application-level middleware.
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